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FRANCHISING + ANTITRUST= CONFUSION:
THE UNFORTUNATE FORMULA
Viewed as a marketing technique, franchising is no novelty to
the business world. Automobile, gasoline and oil service industries,
and bottling companies have used franchising as a means of dis-
tributing goods and services for many years' and still comprise the
largest percentage of the franchising market.2 But, since 1960, fran-
chising has mushroomed into an effective method of marketing a
wide variety of goods and services' and now influences a large seg-
ment of the American economy.4
Ideally, franchising is a cooperative process of doing big busi-
ness by small businessmen.5 It employs a contractual relationship
for marketing goods that combines the managerial, marketing, prod-
uct, and service expertise of the franchise organization with the
substantial investment and entrepreneural efforts of the individual
franchisee.' Although the franchisee is described as an independent
owner, the contract often contains restrictive conditions7 that seem
to violate applicable antitrust legislation.'
Initially, the federal judiciary was reluctant to apply the full
1 For an excellent history of franchising, see H. KURSH, THE FRANCHiSrno BOOm
(1962).
2 The three industries comprise seventy-seven percent of all franchised outlets
and eighty-three percent of all sales. These figures were computed from data compiled
by the International Franchise Association for the year 1964. See J. CURRY, et al.,
PARTNERS FOR PROFIT, A STUDY OF FRANCHISING 11, (1966) [hereinafter cited as
PARTNERS FOR PROFIT]. These percentages today are undoubtedly lower as other fields
of business have flocked to franchising as a means of distribution. See notes 3 & 4
infra.
3 The size and growth rate of franchising generally, and into diversified markets
in particular, was described as follows:
[Iun the past few years, franchising has grown rapidly in other industries,
and will account for an additional $15 billion [above the $50 billion in goods
by automobile, gasoline, and soft-drink companies] in franchised sales this
year. The number of companies running franchise networks has grown six
fold to nearly 1,200 since World War II, and some 30,000 new franchise
outlets will be opened this year, bringing the total to about 250,000. Brayman,
Franchises: Boom in Selling Names and Advise, National Observer, Nov. 22,
1965, at 8, col. 3.
4 In 1964, $59.2 billion in sales through the franchised method of distribution
accounted for approximately thirty-five percent of the total retail sales in the United
States. PARTNERS FOR PROFIT, supra note 2, at 12. By 1966, 330,000 franchisees totalled
$65 billion sales and accounted for ten percent of the GNP. Handler, Statement
Before the Small Business Administration, 11 ANTITRUST BuLL. 417, 418 (1966).
5 PARTNERS FOR PROFIT, supra note 2, at 18.
6 Id.
7 For a discussion of the major contract restrictions see p. 271, and accompanying
notes.
8 See note 76 infra.
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scope of developed antitrust laws to the relatively new franchise
phenomenon, reasoning that they knew too little of the economic
and business aspects of these marketing systems.9 But increasing
legal concern began to coincide with the increasing economic im-
portance of franchising, culminating in a series of federal decisions
confronting the problem.' Ostensibly these recent decisions are con-
sistent with the purpose of the antitrust laws: promoting competition
by preventing concentrations of economic power and, concomitantly,
preserving the independence and autonomy of smaller competitors.
Paradoxically, however, the practical effect of these decisions not
only strikes at the heart of franchising as a modern and efficient
marketing method, but also produces pressures tending to create
vertical integration" which destroys the "independence" of the small
businessman.
This comment explores the economic and contractual aspects of
franchising, and examines some recent antitrust decisions. The pre-
sumptive effect of applying antitrust policy is contrasted to the
actual impact on franchise operations. The resulting dilemma, pre-
sented to the franchisor, is analyzed for possible alternatives open
to him, all of which are inconsistent with both the ends of antitrust
policy and the beneficial aspects of franchising.
SOME ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
As a marketing system, franchising supplies practical business
advantages and promotes important economic benefits. From the
businessman's standpoint, the contractual arrangement between the
franchisor and his franchisee is reciprocally beneficial to both par-
9 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The Government con-
tended that White's franchise contracts contained price fixing and geographical and
customer restrictions that were illegal per se. White did not deny the allegations but
contended that it should be allowed to present evidence of the reasonableness of its
contracts when considered in their own unique business and economic context. The
Supreme Court held that, apart from price fixing, summary judgment was improperly
granted and that the legality of the territorial and customer limitations of White's
franchise contracts should be determined only after trial. Speaking of the customer
and territorial restrictions in the franchise context, Justice Douglas said, "We do not
know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements
emerge to be certain . . . [about holding them illegal per se.]" Id. at 263.
10 See cases discussed in text beginning p. 273 infra. See also, Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Albrecht v. Harold Co., 390
U.S. 145 (1968) ; United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) ; White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
11 When the term is used in this comment, vertical integration means ownership
rather than contractual integration. If the various operations in the distribution
process, such as manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing, are owned outright by
one firm, the company is vertically integrated. Franchising generally forms a chain
through vertical integration by contract, whereas a centrally owned chain is termed
vertical integration by ownership.
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ties. Typically, the franchisee makes a substantial investment for
the franchise in inventory, equipment, property, and personnel.
Within contractual limits broadly reflecting the marketing scheme
of the parties, the franchisee is an independent owner of the busi-
ness. Thus, the success of that business is directly related to his
efforts, dedication, and motivation. Usually he receives a precon-
ceived "package" for marketing the product or service. The package
includes an established brand name, initial training and area man-
agement counseling, location analysis, financial and developmental
aid, and advertising and merchandising resource-pooling. 2 The
franchisee is given an instant reputation in an established product or
service known and accepted by the public.
In return, the franchisor has a ready-made distribution system
for his products or services. Since he can obtain the desired degree
of managerial control without assuming full investment responsi-
bility, he is able to employ his capital more profitably elsewhere.
Also, in some cases, if a franchisee's operation is a multi-product
activity, but the franchisor's is not, then the franchisor has the
advantage of marketing his products within a broad "product mix"
while retaining some managerial control.'3 In most cases he receives
consideration for the privilege of using the franchise. 4 The fran-
chisor also avoids, to a certain extent, local managerial problems
and personal service requirements.
In addition to these practical business advantages, modern
franchising results in several economic benefits. Franchising has
been optimistically labeled as a boon to the small independent busi-
nessman, 15 an alternative to increasing "mergeritis,"' 16 and a hedge
against the growing "bigness" of American business.'
12 Slater, Some Socio-Economic Footnotes on Franchising, BOSTON U. Bus. REV.,
Summer 1964, at 23-25, [hereinafter cited as Slater].
13 This is typically the case of a jobber, for example, a manufacturer of one line
of well-known products which are sold most advantageously alongside of compli-
mentary products. Car polish, for example, is not effectively sold alone, but is
marketed through auto parts stores and other retail outlets where a customer would
expect to find all his automotive needs.
14 Various types of charges are levied individually or in combinations according
to the nature of the franchise arrangement. Some common costs are: a percentage of
the franchisee's gross sales; franchise paid for at the outset of the relationship; rent
paid for the location; and a mark-up on initial equipment. Slater, supra note 12,
at 25.
15 Hearings on Franchise Legislation before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., ist Sess., at 513 (1967).
The specific phrase used is "the salvation of the small independent businessman."
16 Slater, supra note 12, at 20. Specifically, franchising is the "last stand against
the creeping octopus of nationwide mergeritis."
17 Hearings on Distribution Problems Affecting Small Business before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
[Vol. 9
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Realistically, the franchise method of operation does have the
advantage of enabling large groups of individuals with moderate
capital, who might otherwise remain mere employees, to become
independent businessmen. 8 As a self-interested entrepreneur, the
franchisee is highly motivated toward personalized service and local
good will in contrast to the trend of vast chains toward imperson-
alized business. 9 Because the franchisor provides an established
product or service and substantial financial and managerial assis-
tance, franchising provides efficient investment opportunities for
prospective entrepreneurs from minority groups.2
Franchise operations have a remarkably low business failure
rate2' and are a profitable way of doing business22 as their growth
indicates. The Small Business Administration has recently relaxed
regulations measuring "independence" requirements conditioning
private loans.2 Even though the parties are contractually integrated
and controls are exercised over the franchisee, this relaxation was a
direct result of Small Business Administration hearings establishing
the importance of franchising systems to the economy and to small
entrepreneurs.24 Franchising facilitates entry and expansion into
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 194 (1965). Again specifically, franchising is "the ultimate defense
... against the growing encroachment of corporate giantism."
18 In Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), Judge
Dawson stated:
The franchise method of operation has the advantage, from the standpoint of
our American system of competitive economy, of enabling numerous groups of
individuals with small capital to become entrepreneurs. . . . If our economy
had not developed that system of operation these individuals would have
turned out to have been merely employees. The franchise system creates
a class of independent businessmen; it provides the public with an opportunity
to get uniform products at numerous points of sale from small independent
contractors, rather than employees of a vast chain.
19 Slater, note 12 supra, at 26-27.
In the final analysis, franchising is the only logical antidote to a trend to
impersonalized business. However much they admire bigness, Americans prefer
to do business with those to whom they can talk, and if necessary, complain.
The paid manager, unless he rises to the occasion, invariably strikes the
customer as a subordinate person 'who follows orders.'
Presumably the extra effort of the franchisee would stimulate increased demand for
his product or service, thus 'benefiting the franchise organization and the economy.
20 Department of Commerce, Task Force for Equal Opportunity in Business,
Franchising Companies-Business Opportunities for Minority Groups, Dec., 1964.
21 U.S. Chamber of Commerce figures show thirty-five percent of all new busi-
nesses fail within one year and ninety-two percent within five years. For franchise
operators, the comparable one year figure varies between four and six percent and
for five years only twelve percent fail. Stewart, Editorial: The Best Insurance, MOD-
ERN FRANCHISING, June-July, 1968, at 4.
22 Net profits in a well-established franchise may run from fifteen to twenty
percent of gross income. The New Look in Franchising, 24 CHANGING TIMES, Oct.
1967, at 18.
23 Small Business Size Standards, 13 C.F.R. § 121.3-2(a) (1968).
24 The Small Business Administration (SBA) held hearings on March 10, & 11,
1966, on the size standards for determining whether a concern operating under a
franchise agreement is a small business concern. Philip F. Ziedman, general counsel
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industries and markets requiring extensive capital and skilled per-
sonnel and, to that extent, promotes interbrand competition between
firms. 25 Franchise chains provide individual ownership with the
efficiencies attending large scale operations and offer an alternative
to centrally owned chains.26 In short, economic policies as well as
business efficiency benefit from the franchise movement.
of the SBA, submitted a letter, dated November 15, 1967, to the Hearings on Franchise
Legislation before the Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 431-34 (1967), on the results of the
SBA hearings:
It was the consensus of those participating in the hearing ... that franchising
contributes significantly to the ability of small concerns to compete effectively
with larger organizations; that it offers a relatively safe and promising haven
for the small businessman . . . that it provides business opportunities, other-
wise unavailable, for many persons including members of minority groups,
and that it is socially preferable alternative to the further vertical integration
of the American economy since it brings to the economy and society most
of the benefits and few of the evils thereof. Id. at 432.
Prior to Sept. 1, 1964, franchise agreement provisions limiting the right of a franchisee
to make management and business decisions that an "independently operated" business
concern ought to be able to make, made the franchisee an "affiliate" of the franchisor
and ineligible for SBA benefits. A list was provided of thirty restricting provisions-
a substantial number of which gave the franchisor "control" of the franchisee. On
August 31, 1964, that list was narrowed to only four. Finally, on Sept. 13, 1966, as a
result of the hearings noted above, it was recommended that:
The Small Business Administration should consider franchisees as small busi-
ness concerns regardless of the nature of the restrictions in their franchise
agreements so long as the right to profit, with ownership, and risk of loss
is substantially that of an otherwise eligible small business concern. Id. at 432.
See also note 23, supra.
25 Intrabrand competition takes place between sellers of the same brand, usually
marketed by one firm, whereas interbrand competition exists between sellers of dif-
ferent brands made by competing producers. For a further discussion of this point
see note 68 infra and accompanying text.
26 Franchising-Quo Vadis? The Future of Franchising and Trade Regulation,
testimony of Professor Jerome Shuman, Hearings on Franchise Legislation before the
Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 513, 514-15 (1967), takes issue with these concepts. He claims
that "Franchising . . . is not an industry . . . [nleither is it a means of breathing
new life into small businesses, nor does it make independent businessmen out of
persons who would otherwise be employees, it is [merely] a new form of business
organization, an outgrowth of technological evolution." Id. at 515. He substantiates
this statement as follows: 1) The three largest industrial corporations in the world
are all franchisors (General Motors, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Ford Motor
Corporation). Moreover, the so called corporate giants are resorting to franchising in
increasing numbers. 2) Relatively speaking, even many smaller franchisees are large
when compared with the truly independent businesses with which they compete and
often displace. The franchisee has an advantage over an independent businessman of
comparable capital investment in every area where size is important because of his
franchisor's backing and managerial skills. 3) The commercial ties between the fran-
chisor and the franchisee makes their relationship something less than one of autonomy,
giving rise to accusations of "economic serf" as in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1964). 4) Franchising is questionably a deterrent
to mergers. A merger results in ownership integration and a franchise in contractual
integration; in terms of market power and economic impact, the effect can be the
same on the economy and the competitive process. 5) To assert that franchising
offers unique opportunities for minority groups to enter the business field is to assert
[Vol. 9
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LEGAL POLICY
Contractual Aspects
Franchising utilizes a contractual relationship for doing busi-
ness between the franchisee and his franchisor and is subject to
general contract law. The terms of an agreement can be versatile
enough to fit the diverse types of products or services involved and
the business or marketing objectives of the parties.2" Both parties
have substantial investments to protect, and, of course, wish to
oversee the destiny of that investment. Restrictions, controls, and
concessions are exerted contractually upon each other to achieve
their respective business goals. The more common of these con-
tractual terms or understandings are:28 exclusive selling agree-
ments;29 exclusive buying arrangements which include requirement
contracts,30 exclusive dealing contracts,"' tie-in arrangements, 2 and
full line forcing;3 3 territory or customer restrictions;3 4 resale price
restrictions; 3 and other managerial controls.3 6
that top management and customers will, amongst other considerations, close their
eyes to the minority "status" with those with whom they are dealing.
It must be kept in mind, however, that Professor Schuman is favorable towards
franchising as a method of doing business but denies the validity of those arguments
which stress that it should receive special treatment in the law. "[Rlules and regula-
tions must be devised to accommodate it just as has been done in the past with
what are now more traditional forms of business organization . . . ." d. at 515.
27 For a list and explanation of the most common types of franchise contracts,
see Rothenberg, A Fresh Look at Franchising, J. MARKETING, July, 1967, at 53-54.
Briefly, they are distributorship, manufacturing, lease, licensing, conventional, mobile,
co-management, and co-ownership.
28 For a thorough examination of the legal aspects of franchise restrictions listed
in this comment, and the business justification advanced for their use, see generally,
Averill, Antitrust Considerations of the Principle [sic] Distribution Restrictions in
Franchise Agreements, 15 Am. U.L. REV. 28 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Averill];
see also, Covey, Franchising and the Antitrust Laws: Panacea or Problem?, 42 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 605 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Covey].
29 The franchisor agrees not to license another franchisee, and promises not to
compete himself within a designated territory, or for a class of customers. This ar-
rangement obviously works to the benefit of the franchisee. Through eliminating
intrabrand competition he is provided with a local monopoly for the particular brand
of product or service franchised. See Covey, supra note 28, at 609.
30 The franchisee agrees to buy all of his requirements only from the franchisor.
See Id. at 609.
31 The franchisee agrees to handle only the franchisor's products to the exclusion
of competitive goods. See Averill, supra note 28, at 39-40.
32 A franchisee must accept the other products of the franchisor in order to be
permited to carry a major commodity. The major commodity, such as an automobilei
is called the tying product, while the other products, such as parts, are called the tied
products. Id. at 44.
33 An exaggerated form of tie-in arrangement whereby a franchisee must carry
all, or nearly all of the franchisor's product line. Id. at 50.
34 Territory restrictions most commonly come in the form of a geographically
defined area from which the franchisee agrees not to venture. These are called "closed
territories." Id. at 51. Variations on the closed territory are "area of prime responsi-
1969]
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Even though the franchise operation may be designated as
small and marginal within a particular market, the preponderant
power and wealth is normally in the hands of the franchisor, vis-a-
vis the franchisee.37 Illustrative of this point is the fact that of the
broad categories of restrictions listed above, only exclusive selling
agreements work directly in favor of the franchisee. This dominance
of the franchisor may be viewed from opposite perspectives. One
view is that the franchisee must give up the inalienable right to mis-
manage his own business for the privilege of doing business under
the franchisor's aegis.38 The other view is that control over his busi-
ness decisions makes the franchisee an "economic serf" rather than
an independent businessman. 9 To the degree that the franchisee
is an "economic serf" and to the extent that the relationship al-
legedly creates adverse effects on economic competition, the restric-
tions may come into conflict with the antitrust laws.
Applicable Antitrust Policy
Two basic antitrust doctrines are used to determine the legality
of a particular trade restraint. The more absolute and stringent, but
administratively easier formula, is the per se rule of unreasonable-
ness whereby a restaint having a "pernicious effect on competition
and lack of any redeeming virtues" is held to be per se illegal.4 °
This doctrine is easily applied: if a per se label, usually created
from precedents, can be applied to the particular case, then no
further investigation into the reasonableness of the restraint is
necessary. On the other hand, the "rule of reason" requires a greater
analysis of the restraint's actual effect upon the marketplace. A
restraint may be reasonable either because trade is not restricted
to any significant degree,4 or because it is ancillary to and sup-
bility" and "zone of influence" contract clauses designed "to insure proper placement
of distributor outlets, spaced in order to effect even and full exposure of his product
or service to the whole economic community." Id. at 57, 58. In a customer allocation
or restriction contract clause a franchisee agrees not to deal with certain classes or
types of customers.
35 The franchisor stipulates the prices at which his products are to be resold.
See extended discussion of price-fixing, beginning infra at p. 276.
36 Quality and service standards, physical appearance standards, performance
controls, trade mark protection, promotional activity, standardized record keeping and
other managerial considerations may be primarily the domain of the franchisor who
contractually imposes his standards on the franchisee. See Averill, supra note 28 at
60, 64-65; See also Covey, supra note 28, at 611.
37 Eighty-three percent of vertical restrictions are imposed by the franchisor,
J. CURRY, et al., PARTNERS FOR PROFIT, A STUDY OF FRANCHISING 51 (1966).
38 Slater, Some Socio-Economic Footnotes on Franchising, BOSTON U. Bus. REV.,
Summer 1964, at 21.
39 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1964).
40 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
41 Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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portive of a main lawful purpose.42 It is then said to have redeem-
ing virtues.43 The Supreme Court applies these principles under a
broad policy favoring the preservation of competition.
Within the classical economic model, "pure" or "perfect" com-
petition is most effective and workable when overbearing restrictions
are proscribed and "incipient" trends to oligopoly and economic con-
centrations are curbed. Competition is also likely to be greatest when
there are many sellers, none of whom has any significant market
share." The correlative principle is the preservation of the small
businessman's autonomy in the market and his freedom from "un-
due" restrictions. This has long been the Supreme Court's economic
policy and is reflected in recent antitrust pronouncements. In the
illustrative cases involving franchises that follow, the Supreme Court
applied the antitrust doctrines to the facts of each case in an at-
tempt to be consistent with their economic policies.
FRANCHISING AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: SOME RECENT CASES
. In Brown Shoe Company v. United States," Brown, the third
largest producer of shoes in the United States, attempted to merge
with Kinney, the eighth largest shoe seller with over three-hundred
retail outlets. Because the effect may have been to substantially
lessen competition, thereby tending to create a monopoly, the Court
found that such a merger would be a violation of the Clayton Act.
Later, in Brown Shoe Company v. FTC,4 Brown offered valuable
services to hundreds of retail shoe outlets in an attempt to main-
tain control over the retail distribution of its shoes. The contract,
however, stipulated that the retailers must obtain their shoe re-
quirements exclusively or primarily from Brown to the exclusion
of competitors' lines of shoes. The Federal Trade Commission sued
for an injunction against this practice but did not "prove" to the
satisfaction of the district court that the practice lessened competi-
tion or tended to create a monopoly. The custom of giving free
service to those who will buy their shoes is widespread, reasoned the
trial court, and is, therefore, a valid requirements contract. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision 47 saying that section 3 of the
42 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1898).
43 For an excellent discussion of the two rules, see Bork, The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 375 (1966).
44 The United States Supreme Court said explicitly, "[ciompetition is likely to be
greatest when there are many sellers, none of which has any significant market
share." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
45 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
46 339 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1964).
47 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
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Federal Trade Commission Act gave the Commission power to arrest
trade restraints in their incipiency without proof that the restrictions
amount to an outright violation of the antitrust laws.
These cases illustrate the Court's attitude toward "bigness"
in the economy. Very large companies in a particular industry, at-
tempting to vertically integrate with other large companies in a
different but related market, have an extremely difficult task in
justifying the move. Evidence showing the inherent economic effi-
ciency of the integration or other bona fide motives may be irrelevant
if a large percentage of the market is affected. An otherwise legal
trade custom coupled with "bigness" may also become illegal.4 8 Thus,
a requirements contract, such as the agreement employed in Brown,
becomes illegal even though imposed for the lawful purpose of in-
suring the franchisee a sufficient supply, or of providing the fran-
chisor with a predictable market for his output.
Two years later the Court directly confronted the problem of
restrictive franchise contracts and decided against the producer of
Schwinn bicycles. Schwinn is the second largest bicycle manufac-
turer in the United States, controlling approximately thirteen per-
cent of the bicycle market. Beginning in 1951, Schwinn instigated
extensive market research in an effort to more effectively market
their product. As a result of this research, Schwinn developed three
methods of distribution. First, independent wholesale distributors
were assigned specific territories and were instructed to sell only
to franchised dealers. Under the second plan, the "Schwinn Plan",
bicycles were shipped directly to retailers with Schwinn invoicing
the dealers, extending credit, and paying a commission to the dis-
tributors taking the order. Finally, bicycles were distributed by
means of an agency or consignment arrangement between the dis-
tributors and franchise dealers. Each method employed means for
controlling the resale of the bicycles consistent with the efficiencies
developed from Schwinn's marketing research.49
In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Company,50 the Court
said that Schwinn's self-interest alone did not invoke the "rule of
reason" to immunize conduct if that conduct is unlawful in its
impact in the marketplace. 5 Consequently, any sale to independent
distributors, or retailing upon any conditions, agreement, or under-
standing limiting the resale of bicycles was held to be illegal per se.
The only method left legally open to Schwinn to exercise any
48 Id. at 331.
49 Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. LAW. 669, 670-77 (1968).
50 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
51 Id. at 375.
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degree of control whatsoever over its bicycles was through the
agency or consignment agreement. However, the latter are not legal
in every case because they must still satisfy "rule of reason" stand-
ards. Before this method of distribution may be used, a franchisor
must retain "title, dominion or control"; no price fixing may be
imposed; the unfranchised dealers must have adequate sources of
alternate products; and an agency/consignment arrangement must
otherwise meet "rule of reason" requirements.5 2
The Second Circuit had already decided a case involving the
typical modern franchise operation. Susser v. Carvel Corporation,"
involved a fast growing area of franchising--quick service food and
refreshment chains. Carvel deals with over four hundred franchisees
operating ice cream stores under its trademark. Carvel bought ice
cream ingredients and supplies from a wide variety of suppliers
who, in turn, made individual deliveries to the franchise outlets.
Carvel set the prices at which these items were sold to the dealers
who were foreclosed from obtaining supplies elsewhere. Carvel justi-
fied this tie-in arrangement necessitating contractual restraint upon
its dealers on grounds of safeguarding the integrity and value of
the trademark. Because they had to deal with Carvel alone, com-
petition between suppliers took the form of substantial price con-
cessions.: The franchisees received the supplies at considerable
savings over what local suppliers could offer them individually.55
Carvel failed to sustain the tie-in arrangement with sufficient
proof of the necessity for quality controls to protect the trademark,
or proof that specifications for products would be so complex and
detailed as to make it impractical to establish such specifications.5
As a consequence, Carvel's economic leverage over suppliers5 7 and
their contractual restrictions on franchisees58 were illegal. The court
52 Id. at 381.
53 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), cert. dis-
missed as improvidently granted, 381 U.S. 125 (1965). Only the tying arrangement
and, indirectly, the exclusive-dealing arrangement aspects of the Susser case are con-
sidered in this comment.
54 Id. at 514.
55 For example, Carvel sold ice cream cones to its franchisees at $4.80 per 600,
whereas, independently, the same franchisee would have to pay $5.60 per 600, in lots
of twenty-five cases or more. Id. at 514 n.7.
56 See further discussion of tying arrangements at p. 279, infra. See also notes
57 & 58 infra.
57 A tying arrangement is per se unreasonable and unlawful whenever the seller
has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably re-
strain free competition in the market for the tied product, and a "not insubstantial"
amount of interstate commerce is affected. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958). See also, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947).
58 To the extent the franchisor enjoys market control, other potential sellers
1969]
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reasoned that smaller suppliers were unable to effectively compete
with larger producers capable of meeting Carvel's price and service
demands, thus restricting their outlet sources. The court went on to
note that an individual franchisee should not be forced to surrender
his right to negotiate with suppliers of his choice even though he
may enjoy lower prices from his franchisor.59 The effect of this
rationale is to preserve the smaller supplier's ability to compete in
the market with more powerful competitors and to maintain the
autonomy of the franchisee to deal with whomever he wishes. Fur-
thermore, a franchisor may not invoke the defense of in pari delicto
against a franchisee who brings a private antitrust suit even though
the franchisee encourages and supports some of the restraints for
his own benefit.60 Presumably, this places the normally smaller fran-
chisee in the favored position of enjoying illegal restrictions granted
for his benefit (provided, of course, government agencies do not
enter the picture) while receiving treble damages for reciprocal
restrictions imposed for the franchisor's benefit.
THE FRANCHISE INDUSTRY'S DILEMlMA
However correct on precedent or laudable in theory the Court's
"antibigness" policies may be, its attempt at implementing these
policies may work in favor of larger and more powerful franchisors
and create pressure tending toward "bigness" rather than indepen-
dence and autonomy.
An example may be drawn from the prohibition on resale price-
fixing. In a recent case, 1 the Supreme Court held that the freedom
are foreclosed from offering substitutes for the free competitive judgment of the
franchisee. When forced to buy the tied product, a buyer abdicates his independent
judgment as to the tied products' merits and insulates it from the competitive stress
of the open market. If the tied product is superior or less expensive, the buyer should
be free to select it over others. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345
U.S. 594, 605 (1952).
59 Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1964).
60 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
Plaintiff-franchisees had to purchase all mufflers from defendant-franchisor (Midas
Mufflers) and carry the complete Midas line (full-line forcing and tying); refrain
from dealing with any of Midas' competitors (exclusive dealing) ; and comply with
a price maintenance scheme. Plaintiffs were given exclusive territories. Plaintiffs made
"enormous profits," eagerly sought to acquire Midas franchises with full knowledge
of the contractual provisions, and eagerly sought to acquire additional franchises.
The exclusive territory and price maintenance scheme worked to the advantage of
the franchisees, but the tying, full-line forcing, and exclusive dealing arrangements
did not.
61 Albrecht v. Harold Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). The defendant, a morning news-
paper distributor, sells at wholesale to independent carriers who sell at retail. The
carriers were granted exclusive territories which amounted to an absolute monopoly
for morning newspaper service in that area. Defendant advertised a suggested retail
price in its newspapers. The franchise agreement was subject to termination if the
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of a franchisee to determine his own resale price above a fran-
chisor's imposed maximum may not be impaired. This rule was
enforced even though the franchisee enjoyed a complete monopoly
by virtue of an exclusive franchise granted by his franchisor, and
despite the franchisor's attempts to enforce the maximum by actu-
ally competing with the franchisee.
Resale price-fixing, both minimum and maximum in horizontal
and vertical market situations, has been a traditional target of anti-
trust laws. 2 It is used to punish errant franchisees, to drive weaker
competitors out of the market, and to generally restrict the flow of
competition. Aside from its predatory motives, the effect of which
the laws may successfully prevent, vertical price maintenance may
have "redeeming virtues" in terms of economic efficiencies. Main-
taining price structures can lead to: efficiencies in advertising; 61
promotion of pre-sale and post-sale service to customers; 64 rein-
forcement of market division; 65 preservation of uniformity in prod-
uct services; 6" and, provide a means of transferring information.6 7
franchisee's prices to customers exceeded the advertised price. Plaintiff raised his price.
Initially, rather than terminate the franchise, the defendant hired an agency to solicit
customers away from the plaintiff through price competition, and also hired a new
carrier to compete for the service to these customers. The plaintiff, even under threat
of termination and growing competition for his remaining customers, refused to
comply with his franchise agreement. The contract was finally terminated, plaintiff
brought suit, and won a treble damage decision.
62 Agreements to fix maximum prices "no less than those to fix minimum prices,
cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance
with their own judgment." Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.
211, 213 (1951).
63 "A variety of . . instances in which price fixing is essential to advertising
efficiencies is easily imaginable, e.g., the fixing of prices on food items franchised drive-
in operations, and the fixing by individual manufacturers of retal prices of nationally
advertised consumer goods." Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 375, 461 (1966), [hereinafter cited
as Bork].
64 "Where a reseller's price is maintained, he is forced to engage in other forms
of competition in order to make a competitive return." Id. at 454.
65 There might ... be instances of sales at low prices and subsequent resale
across territorial boundaries which was not intended by the manufacturer.
Control of the manufacturer's prices by the group prevents the opportunity
for such arbitrage. . . .Retailers forbidden to advertise or sell at cut prices
will find it more difficult to resell across territorial lines. Id. at 456-57.
66 A large part of the ... franchisor's brand appeal rests upon uniformity of
the product sold by each of it's franchisee's . . . .A ...franchisor wishing
to appeal to those consumers who value a high degree of sales effort must
establish the uniformity of his product so that consumers can rely upon
getting a particular combination of physical product and sales effort at any
... franchisee carrying the brand. Id. at 445.
67 "One reason a ...manufacturer may dictate the retail price ...is the belief
that the manufacturer has greater information as well as greater competence to make
price decisions." Id. at 457-58. In United States v. Nationwide Trailer Rental Systems,
Inc., 156 F. Supp. 800 (D. Kan. 1957), aff'd, 355 U.S. 10 (1957), where a suggested
price schedule was used to give information to the far-flung members of a nationwide
one-way trailer rental service, Nationwide Trailer Rental System stated:
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The franchisor may have sufficient marketing information to deter-
mine the optimum price level at which to sell the product in a given
area, thus protecting the franchisee from making inept business
decisions. Although vertical price maintenance may restrict intra-
brand price competition between franchisees, it may also increase
interbrand competition within the marketplace. 8 And, as Professor
Galbraith maintains, firms with substantial market power legally
arrive at advantageous prices amongst themselves, tantamount to
fixed prices, despite antitrust laws.6 9 Thus, only companies too small
or weak to develop sophisticated methods of price-fixing are, in
reality, affected by antiprice fixing laws designed to foster compe-
tition.O
It was essential to the intelligent conduct of a one-way trailer business by the
numerous small businessmen . . . that they have an estimate of what rates
would be profitable and reasonable in areas to which they send trailers.
Without this information it is impossible for them to bargain intelligently with
their customers. Bork, supra note 63, at 459, citing Defendant's Jurisdictional
Statement, p. 11.
68 Professor Bork says that the interbrand versus intrabrand formulation in
elimination of competition cases is misleading and proposes that determining the
effect of price-fixing or efficiency and restriction of output is superior to the auto-
matic application of the per se rule. Bork, supra note 63, at 472-73. He maintains:
[S]uch a formulation leads courts to make judgments that are not properly
their business. Vertical . . . price-fixing agreements whose legality is proposed
in this article usually involve a decrease in intrabrand competition but
never involve the likelihood of restriction of output [which is a truer measure
of effect on competition]. This means that the parties to each such agreement
are motivated by a desire for increased efficiency. The parties . . . have al-
ready weighed any losses in efficiency due to the suppression of intrabrand
competition and found them more than balanced by gains in other efficiencies.
[It is improper, therefore, to use] . . . the Sherman Act as a license for
courts to second-guess business judgments about degrees of efficiency when
restriction of output is not a danger.... Id. at 472.
69 J. K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 186 (1967). As an illustration
of this point, Professor Galbraith says:
[Tihe three majors in the automobile industry, as the result of long and
intimate study of each other's behavior within the confines of one city, are
able to establish prices which reflect the common interest. And they can do
so with precision....
A group of smaller suppliers of parts ... to the automobile industry will
not have the same capacity for estimating each other's needs and intentions.
. . . Should it become known that in response to their weaker (and more
competitive) position that they have come together to discuss prices, and
thus win some of the ability to control prices that the automobile majors
possess as a matter of course, the law would be upon them like a tiger. It
exempts the market power of the strong. And it partly disguises this exemption
by atacking efforts by the weak to acquire like power. Id. at 186.
70 The [antitrust] law exempts those who possess the market power and
concentrates on those who would try to possess it . . . those who, as the
result of numbers and weakness, must use crude or overt methods to control
their markets and in favor of those who, because of achieved size and power,
are under no such compulsion. Id. at 187.
On the whole subject of present antitrust law, Professor Galbraith concludes:
There is considerable injustice in the immunity enjoyed by those who have
achieved a strong market position as compared with those who, being weaker,
seek, by merger or collusion, to win a stronger position .... [A]ntitrust laws
were placed on the statute books to preserve the power of the market against
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Yet, even if a franchisor's motives are pure and his business
judgment sound, he must tread lightly; otherwise, his overzealous
actions to convince his franchisee of the wisdom of his suggested
prices will elicit a lawsuit. United States v. Colgate & Company7'
established an early principle of antitrust law: that a producer may
unilaterally refuse to deal with distributors who do not market
products or services in the manner desired by the producer. How-
ever, at least where price-fixing is concerned, the Court qualified
the Colgate doctrine in United States v. Parke, Davis & Company.
72
The franchisor is limited to a mere announcement of this pricing
policy and a simple refusal to deal.78 Beyond this, any attempt to
enforce the policy is illegal per se. If the Parke, Davis rule applies
to other franchise restrictions, a franchisor faces probable legal
action with any trade restraint that even approaches those con-
demned by antitrust laws.74 A literal interpretation of the rule forces
the franchisor to draw a fine line between persuasion and coercion.
Fear of sanction under such vague standards may not only detract
from a franchisor's decision-making efficiency but also deprive the
franchisee of the marketing benefits which result from professional
management counseling.
The franchisor's difficulty in conformity to the Court's stand-
ards may be demonstrated by application of the Court's rules to
other contract restrictions. Tying one product to others may be done
only when the protection of goodwill necessitates it or when specifi-
cations for a substitute would be so detailed that they could not
practicably be supplied.7 5 Thus, tying arrangements are illegal per
those who might subordinate it to the purpose of monopoly. Meanwhile some-
thing very different has happened. The mature corporation has taken control
of the market ... to serve not the goal of monopoly but the goals of its
planning. 'Controlled prices are necessary for this planning. And the planning,
itself, is inherent in the industrial system. It follows that the antitrust laws, in
seeking to preserve the market, are an anachronism in the larger world of
industrial planning. Id. at 196-97.
71 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
72 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
78 Id. at 44.
74 The effect of Parke, Davis has been stated to be as follows: "the Supreme
Court has left a narrow channel through which a manufacturer may pass even though
the facts would have to be of such Doric simplicity as to he somewhat rare in this
day of complex enterprise." George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.,
277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d 'Cir. 1960).
75 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). In Fortner Enter-
prises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 37 U.S.L.W. 4297 (U.S. Apr. 7, 1969), the
Court held that extension of credit only on conditions of accepting a sales transaction
or distribution method is a "tying" of the seller's goods to the credit, and per se
illegal if "sufficient" market power and "substantial" quantity of commerce is affected.
The dissent points out that almost all modern selling involves ancillary services offered
only in connection with the sale of one's own product. This is particularly true of
franchising, and this decision carried to its logical extremity would totally destroy
franchising as a marketing method.
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se if a franchisor's products do not have complicated specifications,
or if he cannot justify the need for protecting a patent, a copyright,
or a trademark. Other common restrictions are illegal if they tend
"to substantially lessen competition."76 For example, where a de-
fendant accounted for 6.7 percent of gasoline sales in a seven-state
area, the defendant's exclusive-dealing agreement was held to sub-
stantially lessen competition.7 7 Whether the "quantitative substan-
tiality 7 8 test applies to market shares over 6.7 percent is not clear.70
When the test is applied to other restrictions, it may be said, in gen-
eral, that if the business is small, new, or failing and the restrictions
are supported by valid business justifications, they will be upheld.
However, large companies or companies in a business which is tend-
ing toward an oligopoly, will have an almost impossible burden in
justifying any restrictions.8°
If anti-competitive restrictions should be condemned, present
judicial standards provide franchisors with a dilemma in practical
application and compliance even when the "rule of reason" analysis
is applied to a legal problem. Ostensibly, the "rule of reason" con-
siders the business justifications that a defendant may raise, along
with the effect of the restraint on the market. But if a franchisor
contemplates use of a control device in his franchise operation, he
would first have to determine what constitutes "protection"'" of a
trademark, and his "relevant strength" in the "relevant market" 2
to protect himself from a possible antitrust suit. Answering such
questions and developing guidelines from a case by case study of
antitrust principles is almost impossible and probably will be more
perplexing and unpredictable than useful. In antitrust law, "it is
76 Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964); cf. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
77 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949).
78 Substantiality was defined as, "[r]elative strengths of the parties, the propor-
tionate volume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume of commerce
in the relevant market area, and the probable immediate and future effects which
pre-emption of that share of the market might have on effective competition therein."
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Co., 365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961).
79 Lower court decisions are divided as to whether Tampa overrules Standard
Oil Co. For a discussion of lower court cases since Tampa, see Smith, Vertical Ar-
rangements in Antitrust Law: Exclusive Dealing Arrangements, 22 ABA ANTITRUST
SEcTIoN 18, 28-30 (1963) ; see also Bork, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem
of Exclusive Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, SUPREME COURT REVIEW 267
(1961).
80 Averill, Antitrust Considerations of the Principle [sic] Distribution Restric-
tions in Franchise Agreements, 15 AMER. U.L. REv. 28, 66 (1965) ; see also Day,
Exclusive Dealing, Tying, and Reciprocity-A Reappraisal, 29 O11O ST. L.J. 539,
588 (1968).
81 See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
82 See note 78 supra.
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delusive to treat opinions written by different judges at different
times as pieces of a jig-saw puzzle which can be, by effort, fitted
correctly into a single pattern."83 Trends in judicial thinking may be
discerned from a line of antitrust decisions, but these are not firm
rules easily applied to a practical situation. Even if a firm can afford
expert antitrust counsel as well as the proper market research to
determine the "relevant market" and its "relevant strength," the
firm must still provide adequate capital to cover treble damages or
government compliance orders as insurance against the wide vari-
ance of judicial interpretations. The expense can be prohibitive and
obviously favors the large and powerful.
THE FRANCHISOR'S POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
Many of the problems a franchisor must reconcile in attempting
to interpret and follow the -Court's rules have been stated. If he con-
tinues the normal franchise relationship of contractual integration
he is faced with a maze of case law that obfuscates which channels
are legally open. 84 Commentators have already sought to chart the
franchisor's course through this legal labyrinth.85 Generally, the
franchisor may seek ways to either insure his control over his oper-
ations, or give up control altogether. These alternatives tend to
destroy franchising because they ignore its essence.
Ownership or vertical integration exists when the various oper-
ations in the distribution process, such as manufacturing, wholesaling,
and retailing, are owned outright by one firm. A franchisor can inte-
grate vertically by merging his outlets into the whole organization.
He will then become an integrated chain with complete managerial
control over the destiny of whatever product he is marketing. This,
of course, would require a tremendous outlay in investment, at
least for a franchisor with a distribution system of any consequence
at all. It thus defeats the very purpose of the Supreme Court's
"antibigness" policies in that only larger and economically more
powerful franchisors are in the best position to afford the capital
outlays necessary to integrate. Also, the small independent business-
man becomes a mere employee; he is not preserved in the market
place, and he loses all of his autonomy. Attempts by relatively larger
franchisors to integrate, however, can themselves create antitrust
83 United States v. United Shoe Machine Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curium, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
84 See note 74 supra.
85 See e.g., Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw.
U.L. REv. 595 (1968); Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After Sealy and Schwinn,
12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1181 (1967).
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problems under section 2 of the Sherman Act,86 or section 7 of the
Clayton Act,8" or both. 8
A franchisor may relinquish control by adopting the "open
market system" whereby a producer sells his product to the dis-
tributors and no further ownership interest or contractual relation-
ship exists between them. The franchisor may sell his product or
service to the franchisee without restricting the franchisee in any
significant manner. The Supreme Court favors this method because
it is the "usual marketing situation" and "since most merchandise
is distributed by means of purchase and sale."819 This view, unfor-
tunately, ignores the unique nature of the franchise system-its
ability to combine relatively small independent units and the econo-
mies of large scale professional management controls, thus providing
an alternative to integrated chains.
If, for whatever reasons, a franchisor deems it necessary to
maintain vertical controls, the safest way"0 is probably through the
agency/consignment method of distribution, legitimized, with qualifi-
cations, in the Schwinn decision. In that case franchising was sum-
marily equated with "confinement of distribution,"' but that ration-
ale, by itself, fails to explain why restraints may be legally imposed
if "title, dominion, and risk of loss" is retained while the same
restraints imposed by contract are illegal per se-a difference, seem-
ingly, in form rather than substance.92 Nevertheless, such an
,86 "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, . . . any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, . . . shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
87 "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, . . . stock or other share
capital . . . or assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where . . .
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoy." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
88 TRADE REG. REP. 4430 (1968) contains the latest merger guidelines. How-
ever, "integration by merger is more suspect than integration by contract, because
of the greater permanence of the former." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 366 (1963).
89 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967).
90 Agency/consignment arrangements were originally held to be valid, even if
they contained resale price restrictions. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S.
476 (1926). Although not expressly overruling General Electric, Simpson v. Union Oil
Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), held price-fixing consignment agreements illegal, the facts
of both cases being virtually indistinguishable. Now Schwinn holds that this may be
the only method of distribution that will sustain vertical restraints.
91 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967).
92 Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 22 (1964). The Court held that the
substance or effect of a restraint will be considered, and not the form that it takes
or name 'by which it is called. Union Oil tried to cover an illegal "consignment" to
fix prices by calling it an "agency" arrangement, but the Court ignored the labels
and considered only the impact of the arrangement on the marketplace as a ,whole.
Union Oil apparently retained "title, dominion, and risk of loss." However, one com-
mentator notes that "[Tihe teaching of Schwinn is that in antitrust cases form is
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arrangement requires the capital necessary to maintain the inven-
tory which a franchisor must now own. It may also require much
more time and expense to readjust present marketing systems to
comply with the new method of distribution. Again, this works in
favor of the richer and more powerful franchisors. Furthermore, a
franchisor, considering the Schwinn rule too burdensome, may de-
cide to vertically integrate. For example, the Schwinn Company has
announced to its independent dealers the intention of ultimately
distributing its bicycles and other products through wholly owned
sales subsidiaries. 3 Presumably, complete vertical integration awaits
acquisition of adequate capital.
CONCLUSION
Neither the "open market" nor the "vertical integration" sys-
tems reconcile the conflict between independent ownership and effi-
cient management control. This conflict is accommodated by the
franchise system; however, many aspects of contractual integration
are irreconcilable with "the ancient rule against restraints on alien-
ation." The Supreme Court apparently realizes the conflict to some
extent. 5 But, to apply verbal expressions of past economic condi-
tions to modern marketing concepts, ignores the overall picture of
what is happening to our complex economy. 6 The Court's pro-
nouncement in White Motor Company v. United States,97 that "we
do not know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which
these vertical arrangements emerge" may be a more realistic atti-
tude9 8 than providing Court decisions for the sake of "guidance,"
more important than substance." Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After
Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 595 (1968).
93 Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. LAW. 669, 686 (1968).
V4 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967).
95 "All vertical restrictions . . . and all franchising" is not illegal per se, because:
Such a rule might severely hamper small enterprises resorting to reasonable
methods of meeting the competition of giants of merchandising through
independent dealers, and it might sharply accelerate the trend towards vertical
integration of the distribution process. Id.
96 "With all deference, 'the ancient rule against restraints on alienation' would
appear to be no more relevant to the solution of current distribution problems than
the Rule in Shelley's Case would be for solving problems in the merger field." Pollock,
4lternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 595, 601 (1968).
97 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
98 Justice Stewart criticized the Schwinn decision, stating:
The Court today is unable to give any reasons why, only four years later,
this White precedent should be overruled. Surely, we have not in this short
interim accumulated sufficient new experience or insight to justify embracing
a rule automatically invalidating any vertical restraints .... Indeed, the Court
does not cite or discuss any new data that might support such a radical change
in the law . . . Such a rule ignores and conceals the 'economic and business
stuff out of which' a sound answer should be fashioned. United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 393 (1967).
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if in fact, the trend toward "bigness" continues, and confusion
reigns. The Supreme Court appears preoccupied with preserving
"ancient rules" rather than adopting new principles to cope with
the twentieth century phenomenon of franchising.
Denis A. Eymil
